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Abstract: In the Netherlands, dealing with the risk of flooding in the face of the current climate change
requires a governance approach that is less based upon the long-standing tradition of prevention
and protection, and more oriented toward ideas of resilience and adaptivity. Such an approach
is assumed to be more resilient compared to static approaches and better equipped to deal with
the indeterminate character of a problem like flood risk. This article presents the Dutch attempt
to introduce a more polycentric and adaptive governance approach in flood management, called
multilayered safety (MLS). We studied this approach via interviews and an extensive document study,
and analyzed the institutions governing the issue using the Institutional Analysis and Development
(IAD) framework of Elinor Ostrom. For years, the issue was in the hands of a small network of actors,
mainly occupied by water experts and governed by a strong lead organization and permanent bodies.
While introducing a new, more adaptive policy concept the government encountered both resistance
and inability within the existing policy regime. This article shows that the issue of flood safety was
successfully ‘tamed’ for decades. Adopting a more adaptive and polycentric approach necessitates
‘untaming’ the issue of flood safety.
Keywords: IAD framework; adaptive governance; multi-level safety; untaming
1. Introduction
The risk of flooding grows because of more extreme rainfall, sea-level rises, higher river water
discharges, and more intense storms. Scholars are, therefore, heavily discussing the basic principles
of the current approach of dealing with flood risk. For a long time, the Dutch approach to flood-risk
management was mainly based upon the idea of prevention [1]. Over the last 10 centuries, a whole
system of dikes and dams was developed in order to protect the Low Countries from flooding.
This system was further refined following the major flooding of 1953, after which the world-famous
delta works were realized, and a whole regime of legal flood-risk norms was established. To date,
the Dutch system of protecting a highly flood-prone country against flooding is seen as an international
hallmark of flood-risk management.
This system can be described as a ‘domesticated or tamed’ strategy [2]. In such a system,
an ill-structured problem, such as water safety, is split up into manageable partial tasks [3] (p. 578),
resulting in a lack of reflexivity, resilience, and inclusion of new and local experience and knowledge [2]
(p. 11). Problem taming is aimed at reducing and controlling wicked problems, by scoping and
delineating the problem in such a way that it fits the existing administrative expertise and policy
responsibilities [3]. In other words, the existing organizational structure and body of knowledge define
how a problem is dealt with. Roberts [4] adds to this the idea that in the case of taming, authority is
transferred into the hands of a few selected actors, based upon their hierarchical position and with
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the authority to deal with the (strictly defined) issue. Roberts [4] wrote that these ‘tame’ systems
are characterized by authoritative strategies based on preexisting organizational lines of functional
specialization [3] (p. 578). Ostrom [5] and also Hardin [6] considered such strategies too narrow to be
sustainable. Even agencies involved in water safety feel that taming strategies are undesirable and
unsatisfactory, as they are relatively static, difficult to change, and not adaptive to new circumstances.
In the quest for suitable and adaptive governance approaches, we can learn a great deal from the
work of Elinor Ostrom [7–9]. She demonstrated that adaptive and polycentric governance systems
are able to cope more effectively with such issues [9]. In addition, Ostrom [9,10] asserted that the
theoretical support for the positive influence of polycentric and adaptive governance approaches is
large (p. 284). She [11] argued that, if governance is adaptive, it will be able to resolve and grasp the
issue in a sustainable way.
The Dutch debate on a new approach to flood safety closely resembles the search for a more
polycentric governance system. The Dutch Delta Program introduced a new paradigm, called
‘multilayered safety’ (MLS), based upon a more inclusive scope and more integrative collaboration
around flood-risk management. It differs quite significantly from the existing policy paradigm,
focused upon flood protection, and is aimed at reorienting the flood management system toward a
risk paradigm, in contrast to the dominant probability paradigm [12]. However, it turned out to be
very complicated to implement this new approach because it necessitates ‘untaming’ of the issue of
flood safety. Untaming means acknowledging the multifaceted character of the issue, as well as the
complexity and controversy surrounding it, and trying to do justice to its wickedness. This approach
is highly controversial because policymakers are insecure about the new strategy and scope of the
‘reframed problem’, and untaming is also very complicated on an institutional level. In this article,
we aim to determine whether and to what extent introducing MLS can be seen as an attempt to develop
a more polycentric and thus loosely structured institutional regime, as well as to explain its low level
of success. In the following chapters, firstly, we address the way in which Ostrom [13] described
governance arrangements: the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework.
Elinor Ostrom et al. developed the IAD framework to assist researchers in studying action
situations [8]. According to Ostrom [8], every policy situation has a few general building blocks that
can be studied as an action situation, in which actors choose and alternate amongst strategies that lead
to changes in the decision-making process [14]. These building blocks include (1) the participants,
(2) their positions, (3) and their actions, as well as (4) their control over and (5) information about
(6) the cost–benefit analyses and (7) outcomes ([8], (p. 189); [15], (p. 27)). Zooming in on such a
specific action situation—such as the flood-safety issue—obviously means a simplification of the
complexity inherent in an action situation. However, systematically approaching this action situation
and the accompanying governance rules make the IAD framework fruitful when attempting to track
changes over time while simultaneously keeping rich descriptions of the case. Understanding such
action situations and the related changes is important in efforts to design new approaches [8,16,17].
We deliberately opted for this framework because it offers an extensive typology of (institutional)
rules to describe concrete governance situations, but it also helps to distinguish between loose and
tighter appearances of such rules. Other frameworks (e.g. [18,19]) mention governance elements as
well; however, the IAD framework specifically focuses on the tightness of the rules and thus allows
for comparison.
In the following paragraphs, we will first present the material and methods used to analyze the
case. Thereafter, we discuss the Dutch case of MLS and study the institutional rules in the case. We end
this article with analysis and conclusion.
2. Materials and Methods
To call climate change in the highly flood-prone Netherlands a complicated problem is quite
an understatement. Not only is climate change a contested phenomenon but the strategy to tackle
its consequences is also highly disputed within Dutch politics (cf. [12]). The exact consequences of
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climate change are uncertain, multifaceted, and related to each other in a nonlinear way [20]. There
are thus no optimal solutions (i.e., solutions with definitive and objective answers). Climate change
adaptation levies enormous costs and has broad consequences for landscape quality and similar issues
(cf. [21,22], p. 9).
For a long time, flood safety was considered a technical issue that could be solved by means
of technical expertise. There was a normative consensus in Dutch society and strong support for
governmental action to safeguard the Netherlands against flooding, especially after the floods of
1953. With the help of a set of clear norms for flood safety, a whole system of dike maintenance,
inspection, and enforcement was developed that functioned quite well. These norms were entirely
based upon the “probability” of a flood: the dikes have to meet a certain standard that equals the
probability of flooding of 1 in 1000, 3000, or 10,000 years (dependent upon population density and
infrastructure development).
However, the consequences of climate change (more soil erosion, higher river water discharges, as
well as sea-level rises) put this technical system under significant pressure [23]. It becomes increasingly
difficult to implement the appropriate measures to meet the norms [23]. Moreover, it is recognized
that meeting the norm does not mean that a flood cannot occur. Although the likelihood is low due to
the impact of climate change, the risk of a flood increases. Sixty years after defining the legal norms,
the consequences of a potential flood (and thus the risk) are much higher because investments in the
infrastructure behind dikes (houses, companies, infrastructure, etc.) are enormous, and more people
live in flood-prone areas. Thus, a potential flood will cause more casualties and economic losses.
Hurricanes Katrina and Harvey were an important triggering event that fueled a discussion about the
consequences of such a disaster [24].
At the same time, the normative consensus underlying the traditional ‘protection’ paradigm
also eroded to some extent. Citizens increasingly question dike-enforcement projects. They object to
the impact of dikes on their environment and the negative consequences for ecological, landscape,
and cultural values. In various cases, (recurring) dike-enforcement operations have met fierce resistance
from inhabitants who remained unconvinced of the necessity and asked for alternative solutions [25].
In the scientific community, the concern is growing that structural flood-protection measures have
‘created flood disasters’ [26]. The focus has gradually shifted from a ‘protect-and-react’ regime
(managing the flood) which results in a ‘safe development paradox’ [27] by continuing the exposure of
communities to the changing residual risk (the remaining chance that a disaster will occur), toward
a regime in which the changing nature of the risk is managed proactively (managing the risk and
strengthening resilience). Many authors have stressed that adapting to climate change for reasons of
flood safety necessitates more resilient socio-ecological systems to deal with ‘unexpected’ shocks.
In the context of the Dutch Delta Program, several proposals have been developed to increase
resilience and adaptiveness in the Dutch flood domain [28]. However, these attempts have only resulted
in marginal changes in the dominant policy paradigm. In this article, we analyze these proposals with
the help of the IAD framework of Ostrom [5,8,13] to understand the efforts to realize a more adaptive
and polycentric governance approach. The second author of this article extensively analyzed the
single case study described in this article. He was involved in two important policy-advice trajectories
regarding the revision of Dutch flood-risk management [15,29]. The Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure
and Environment commissioned these trajectories to explore the possible governance approaches for
implementing the new paradigm of MLS. Furthermore, he was the main evaluator of three pilots in
which the new paradigm was tested [30]. The pilots were meant to explore both the physical and
technical possibilities of MLS and the possibilities for an alternative governance approach to explore
and implement such an alternative flood-risk strategy.
Given the research aim of this study, we opted for a qualitative approach that focuses on how
involved actors interpret the change in policy paradigm, as well as how the governance arrangement
and accompanying rules evolve. The more factual question about what really changed can be
answered by analyzing policy documents and procedures to identify which elements of the Dutch flood
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management regime are described therein. To gain additional insights into how these changes were
perceived, more than 50 key players were interviewed, and 10 focus groups with experts and officials
were conducted. In addition, we analyzed contributions to the debate on flood-risk management
reform and entries on diverse professional Internet forums. In the interviews, more than 30 experts,
civil servants, and responsible authorities at national, regional, and local levels participated, and some
respondents were interviewed twice. Furthermore, a survey was conducted, in which preferences
regarding the new flood-risk regime were investigated [15]. In addition, the second author was actively
engaged in the case as a participatory observer. He observed meetings among experts, practitioners,
and officials who were discussing the issue of multilayered safety. Over 10 interactive meetings were
attended between 2012 and 2015 to discuss the concept of MLS.
2.1. The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework
Institutional rules consist of procedures and mechanisms that actors agree upon jointly
(i.e., rules-in-use in the action situation) and influence how particular positions, actors, information,
and actions are defined within the action situation [31]. These rules constitute the capacity ‘to overcome
dilemmas and create effective governance’ (Blomquist, as quoted in [11]). In other words, the outcome
of an action situation is based upon the extent of organized (or collective) action between independent
organizations, in cooperation, to achieve a goal [8].
2.1.1. Operationalizing the Rules-in-Use in Flood Safety
While the IAD framework helps to sketch the action situation and then to study the institutional
rules governing the situation, we still need a systematic way to compare how the rules change over
time. In this article, we develop the rules-in-use—attached to specific times in the development of the
approach to govern flood safety—of the IAD framework (see Figure 1 [8]) to make them suitable to
study the case, as well as to compare the governance approach over time. We do not claim that we
have found a way to study all types of governance approaches that exist, and we are well aware that
this framework can be operationalized in many different ways. As Ostrom [13] concluded, an overall
testable set of rules is not achievable, as there are too many rule configurations possible because
governance approaches vary too much.
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In the end, how loose or tight the approach is, defines how stringently the governance approach
presses organizations [32]. Many authors, including Elinor Ostrom herself, have made a distinction
between tight, less tight, or lax rules [17,33].
In tight approaches, (self-established) authority is often the way to encourage organizations to
follow-up on decisions and objectives [34] (i.e., superiors or lead organizations determine the actions
of their subordinates). Tight approaches (or tightly coupled systems) are comparable with what
Chisholm [34] called transitivity. A tight approach refers to a hierarchical chain of actors and assumes
that, whenever an actor A takes a decision, actor B follows this decision. Translated to the action
situation and the rule configuration, an action situation is tightly governed if institutional rules strictly
determine how participants should adapt [31]. If rules are tight, participants have limited options,
which leads to less uncertainty. Therefore, Roberts [4] called setting up a tight governance approach a
‘taming strategy’. In such situations, power is in the hands of a few actors with authority, and it is
much easier to predict outcomes compared to a situation in which rules are less strict [4,33]. It also has
a downside. Elmore [35] argued that tight approaches could lead to more checks, norms, and formal
decision points, which can create delays. Furthermore, many authors stress that such tight approaches
can be met with reluctance or resistance by organizations because tight governance can diminish the
autonomy of organizations ([8] (p. 284), [31,36]).
Loose approaches lie on the other end of the scale and are similar to self-organizational networks,
in which autonomous—not guided by binding rules—participants discuss and contemplate issues [31].
Which actors are necessary at the table is determined based on the task at hand, not because of
the organizational chart [34,36]. Roles and actions are continuously adjusted based on experience,
and tasks are generally established by negotiation among the participants. A loose approach is almost
like an ‘adaptive device’ ([35] p. 608). Participants have leeway in such approaches, which they can
use to deal with conflicting or complex demands. However, not adapting, adhering, or exhibiting
deviant behavior may lead to distrust [37]. In this way, a loose approach is almost like a self-reinforcing
mechanism because the rules integrate and bind participants based on the issue, trust, and loyalty [31].
As such systems are flat—there is no one ‘center of authority’—they may appear to be disordered ([34],
(p. 54), [38]).
Both types have positive sides and challenges [31,39]. Besides the pitfalls per type, Benz [31] (p. 14)
also wrote that, if the type of approach does not fit the organizational style, policy implementation and
decision-making are both likely to end in an impasse. The tight approach resembles what Rittel and
Webber called ‘the systems approach of the first generation’. The second generation resembles a loose
governance approach, based upon an open dialogue with participants, explorative argumentation,
and an iterative search about the characteristics of the problem and a possible solution [21].
When researchers think of Elinor Ostrom and the IAD framework, studying common pool issues is
what immediately comes to mind. Although the IAD framework is often used to analyze common-pool
issues like forest, irrigation, or fisheries management, the framework is not restricted to studying
common-pool resources. Elinor Ostrom [11] (p. 646) shows that the IAD framework is compatible with
public goods as well [40]. Furthermore, the framework has been used by many other researchers focusing
on flood risk e.g., [41,42]. The following paragraphs describe the elements of the IAD framework and
the way we operationalize each element by using the four-point scale, leading to a rich and fine-grained
method to score governance approaches on all their rules ranging from (1) tight rules to (4) loose rules.
2.1.2. Boundary Rules
The participants constitute the first element of the action situation [8]. In this article, organizations
are considered to be the participants. Boundary rules describe how exclusive or open the collaboration
is to participants, in the beginning, or along the way. These rules also indicate who can say something
about ‘the water issue’: who is obliged to cooperate, which actors are excluded, and how participants can
exit the action situation. Jordan and Schubert [43] described the boundary rules with three dimensions,
including the number of participants, whether they are sectoral or trans-sectoral, and the stability.
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To operationalize this rule, two aspects were combined: the level of stability (based on [43,44]) and
the diversity of participants (based on [45]). How open or closed the boundaries are can be described
by the level of stability, which ranges from stable to unstable [43]. For the diversity of the participants,
a distinction was made between vertical and horizontal linkages, in line with Bouckaert et al. [45].
One could think of vertical linkages between different hierarchical layers of organizations, as well as
horizontal linkages between organizations of different policy sectors, portfolios, or different parts of
the triple helix (universities, companies, and governments).
A tight participant constellation is highly institutionalized, formal, obliged, and restricted in
terms of access to new participants. An open, ad hoc participant constellation, based on voluntary
participation, is a loose arena. In loose approaches, the participant constellation is highly diverse,
and the boundaries are open, fluent, and accessible to new participants. In tight approaches (see the
left column in Table 1), the participant constellation is closed, and clusters’ participants from one
vertical hierarchy. The four institutionalization forms in Table 1 were borrowed from Van Waarden [44]
and [43] combined with the vertical/horizontal linkages of Bouckaert et al. [45]. This dimension does
not concern the centralization of power or the positions in the governance approach, it merely concerns
the access and boundaries of the constellation.
2.1.3. Positions Rules
Secondly, next to the participant constellation, participants are, because of rules, agreements,
and mandates, situated in different positions [8]. The actor’s position in an action situation
determines the extent of influence, as well as the bargaining and veto power, of a certain actor [46].
The operationalization of this dimension builds on the work of Provan and Kenis [47].
Positions may be, at one extreme, collectively structured (i.e., shared) by a separately created
organization that deals with the administration, communication, and coordination tasks [47]. An action
situation governed by a separately created administrative organization is the most highly structured
and tightest form of governance. At the other extreme, positions may not be structured at all and
thus participant governed, which is a very loose type of governance. In such a situation, members
themselves govern their actions. Another example of loose governance occurs when the network
(or collective body) acts as the basic entity where activities are governed, such as when a network
functions as the collective structure in which consensus can be reached. Column 2 of this dimension
describes a situation in which a single participant takes on the role of a lead organization [47].
2.1.4. Choice Rules
Choice rules determine the leeway a participant has, as described in the mission of the action
arena, in terms of when the participant may, must (not), or should take action. Although Ostrom [8]
employed the ‘attributes, deontic, aim, conditions, or else’ (ADICO) framework [48] as a systematic
way to describe the rules-in-form [49], we used it to operationalize the leeway on the organization has.
Ostrom distinguished between a rule, a norm, and a strategy (see also [49]). The ADICO grammar can
help us determine if the objective is governed by a leading rule, a norm, or a strategy.
(1) Attributes: Who is addressed by the mission?
(2) Deontics: The prescriptive nature of a mission statement. If a deontic exists, we know that
something is obliged, permitted, or forbidden.
(3) Aims: What is the aim of the actions in the mission statement?
(4) Conditions: Under what circumstances should the attribute do something (e.g., in which period,
by which deadline, etc.)?
(5) Or else: The sanction if the participant does not follow the new demands. [49]
An objective containing each of the ADICO components is considered to be a rule. An objective
containing the first four components (ADIC, i.e., those without sanction) is characterized as a
norm. Objectives that only contain an attribute, aim, and condition (AIC)—and no sanction or
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prescription—are considered to be strategies [50]. If there is a tight and guiding rule, there is a strong
degree of certainty [51] about what is expected of the participants. The loosest type of rule is a
statement, which consists of an attribute (A) and an aim (I).
2.1.5. Information Rules
The fourth element of the IAD framework (see Table 1) is the information a participant has
about how to reach the strategy and about the tasks of the other participants. This dimension does
not stress the frequency or the amount of information, rather, it stresses the kind of information [8].
A situation in which a participant has a unique part of the information can lead to protection and
‘bargaining’, and it is the actor with the most information who has a dominant position [52]. In the
situation of incomplete information and deficits, the strategies of the participants are ‘messy’ and
uncoordinated [53]. Hood [54] distinguished between information that tightly and loosely presses
organizations to adapt. Information is tight when responsibilities are ex-ante thoroughly described,
involving the separation of ‘coordination’ and ‘implementation’ activities ([51], (p. 12); [52], (p. 34)).
Another tight type also concerns an ex-ante described strategy and tasks, without this separation in
‘coordination’ and ‘implementation’ activities.
Information about the strategy and the tasks set during the process in the core group is looser.
The group can agree on the strategy and tasks as a norm, but this can also be left to the participants
themselves. In such situations, there is a rich exchange of information, with a lot of leeway for learning
or adaptation [55]. Information, here, is seen as a collective asset. Participants of such loose types
communicate on a personal, rather than formal, level with each other, which can result in more ‘noise’
and different conceptions of the task at hand [56]. Furthermore, participants who do not participate in
the coordination process lack the information of those who do.
2.1.6. Aggregation Rules
The fifth element is the control that participants in the action situation have, how power is played
out, how participants can affect the outcome, and how they reach final decisions [47]. Aggregation
rules determine, for instance, whether a decision by a participant is needed to proceed to action and
the implementation phase. In other words, aggregation rules can be symmetric (e.g., unanimity or
voting schemes) or nonsymmetric (e.g., a leader takes a decision on behalf of the others, such as a
chairman or lead organization) [8].
Compared to the position rules, which explain how the positions and the approach are structured,
this dimension, ‘aggregation rules’, describes how participants come to decisions in the action situation.
The literature tends to focus on three distinct forms, unicentric (tight), multicentric (having more than
one authority), and pluricentric (loose) [57–59]. The role of the coordinator in a unicentric form is not
to gain or to monopolize power but to perform roles that ‘normal’ participants are unable to perform:
foreseeing threats, disasters, and deadlock, as well as undertaking long-term planning (Mulgan, 1997,
as cited in [60]).
2.1.7. Payoff Rules
The cost–benefit analysis that the participant makes about the utility gained by either cooperation
or defection is the sixth element of the IAD framework [8]. The ‘payoff’ can be either an extrinsic
reward or sanction or an intrinsic valuation (e.g., joy, shame, or guilt [8]). In government organizations,
the payoffs are highly institutionalized through accountability approaches. Accountability can influence
policy coordination in different ways. Firstly, making organizations accountable places emphasis
on goal formulation and achievement. Secondly, accountability systems can enable participants to
comprehend the potential benefits of and pay attention to policy targets. Thirdly, accountability can
aid in detecting and resolving overlaps and conflicts amongst policy objectives [61].
Fox [62] helped to operationalize this dimension by discussing two basic dimensions of accountability:
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• ‘Soft face’ accountability, peer review, the loosest type of accountability, implies dissemination
and access to information (see 4 in Table 1). Answerability to specific coordination function means
that organizations have the obligation to answer questions regarding their decisions and actions
to a certain coordination function [62,63].
• The ‘hard face’ form of accountability includes answerability plus the possibility of sanctions.
Types (2) and (3) in Table 1 are types of institutional answerability of the involved organizations
to the coordinating actor: one type without an inspection, sanctions, or rewards, and the other
type with these elements. The tightest form is what Fox [62] called the ‘hard’ accountability type:
performance-based accountability to the coordinating actor with sanctions and the possibility to
investigate actual institutional behavior.
2.1.8. Scope Rules
Lastly, the scope describes the range of possible outcomes that could be affected, and it specifies
the ultimate goal that must be achieved [8]. How the scope is seen affects what is needed to reach the
outcomes. These are the envisioned outcomes—not on the level of the participants but on the level of
‘the collective’. The scope is, in the majority of instances, explicated in general mission statements.
According to Alter and Hage [64], the scope is the extent to which participants frame and see
the mission they want to achieve in the action situation in a comprehensive way. On the one hand,
this can be done broadly and holistically by seeing the problem and solution in a multidimensional
and multidisciplinary way. First of all, ‘multidimensional’ means that the solution is the extent to
which the problem and solution are seen ‘holistically’, for instance, that an area is a social, natural,
geographical, and a political place. Secondly, ‘multidisciplinary’ means that the expertise of different
professions is needed to understand the problem and find a solution. A broad framing leads to
a wide-ranging assessment about which services, programs, and objectives should be met by the
participants to target a particular problem. On the other hand, the problem and the solution can be
seen more narrowly. A narrowly defined scope leads to objectives being unambiguous and more
straightforward [64], as well as monodimensional and monodisciplinary goals and outcomes. In such
a situation, it is clear who is responsible, who should take action, and how the goal must be achieved.
Hence, monodimensional monodisciplinary goals and outcomes often explicitly link lead organizations
to a problem, in which the organizations have a (self-established) authority over the action situation,
and subsequently, the relations in the action situation are more tightly structured. Table 1 presents the
various rules, using the IAD framework of Ostrom [8], and the different gradations between loose and
tight versions of these rules.
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Table 1. Rules in a governance action situation (based on [13]).
Tight Coupling ←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Loose Coupling
1 2 3 4
Boundary rules
Closed/restricted, ordered coalition,
multi-level (more than two) vertical
linkages
Permanent coalition multi-level
(more than two), vertical
linkages
Ad-hoc relationships (based on
committee-, advisory work).
multiple juxtaposed, organizations
(or actors), horizontal linkages
Open/fluent, ad-hoc temporary,
horizontal linkages, multiple
juxtaposed organizations
(or actors), horizontal linkages
Position rules Administrative organizationgoverned (separately created)
Lead organization (either
department or agency)
governed
Network governed Internally participant governed
Choice rules Rule (ADICO): All the elements
Norm (ADIC) attribute,
aimAttribute, Aim, condition,
and deontic
Strategy (AIC): Attribute, aim, and
condition Statement (AI): Attribute, aim
Information rules
Strategy and tasks are ex-ante
formally described, information
separated per task
(e.g., ‘coordination’ and
‘implementation’).
Strategy and tasks are ex-ante
formally described, not
specified per specific task.
Strategy and tasks developed
within the core group as a guiding
norm, relatively rich exchange of
information.
Information is a collective asset,
information with slack.
Aggregation rules
Unicentric, coordinator makes
decisions, with mandate,
sanctions–incentives
Unicentric (e.g., coordinator
without sanctions–incentives)
Multiple participants, democratic
decision making
Pluricentric, coordinators in
multiple organizations
Pay-off rules
Performance-based accountability,
with sanctions or rewards, with
possibility to investigate actual
institutional behavior
(e.g., inspections)
Institutional answerability to
specific coordination function,
with sanctions or rewards
Institutional answerability to
specific coordination function, no
inspections, sanctions, or rewards
Dissemination and access to
information, no sanctions or
inspections—Peer review
Scope rules
Narrowly defined
mission—monodisciplinary and
monodimensional
Narrowly defined
mission—monodimensional,
but multidisciplinary
Broad defined mission –
multidimensional and
multidisciplinary
Open ended
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3. Results
When we try to deduce the rules that structure the action situation sketched above, it becomes
clear that the governance approach governing flood safety until 2008 was rather tight (see Table 2
second column). For a long time, the governance regime regarding flood safety can be characterized
as a highly tight governance approach that consists of a small coalition of interconnected actors with
clear jurisdictions, which uses a highly formalized and detailed set of rules in order to realize a clear
objective. Thus, there is a robust system of legal norms for flood protection. This system is embodied in
a quite independent network of autonomous organizations responsible for implementing these norms.
Within this network, there is a strong sectoral focus upon one dominant idea, namely prevention by
means of protective measures.
This approach resembles the idea that flood management is a complicated, but technical, issue that
can be dealt with in a well-structured way (a problem that can be ‘tamed’ [21]). The National Ministry
of Infrastructure and Environment is responsible for flood management. The National Agency of
Public Works and the regional water boards are responsible for implementing the norms. They focus
their activities on the dikes, and only in very exceptional cases, a more spatial perspective is used to
think about flood management strategies. The Room for the River program (2003–2016) can be seen as
a first attempt to apply a more integrated focus by including aspects of discharge capacity and water
levels in the decision to replace or to enforce the dikes along the main rivers [65]. When it comes to
implementation (e.g. dike-enforcement projects or maintenance activities), other actors are informed or
consulted, but they are not in a position to alter or to veto what has to be done in the eyes of the water
authorities, the scope they use, or the alternatives they select. The maintenance of the flood defense
system is based upon periodical inspection reports (every six years). In Table 2 (second column) we
summarize the various rules that characterize the traditional approach of flood management.
3.1. The Delta Program and the (Envisioned) Concept of Multilayered Safety (MLS)
In 2008, a second Delta Commission was appointed to prepare advice about how the Netherlands
could deal with the consequences of climate change. The report of the Veerman Committee stimulated
the Dutch government to rethink the current methods of flood management. In 2009 the National
Water Plan put the quest for another flood-risk policy on the national policy agenda and introduced the
idea of MLS. The concept of MLS is based upon the idea that flood management has to become more
risk-based and thus must have an open eye regarding the following question: What if a flood actually
does happen? The concept grants a more prominent role to measures mitigating the impact of a possible
flood by emphasizing the importance of risk management and planning strategies. It distinguishes
amongst three layers of safety. The first layer includes dikes and other means to prevent flooding
(the traditional approach of flood protection). The second layer consists of spatial measures that can
help to reduce the impact of a flooding event. The third layer has to do with all sorts of activities
regarding crisis and disaster management. Figure 2 presents this idea of MLS.
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In 2010, the Dutch Cabinet appointed the national Delta Commissioner, and he started in 2011
by preparing the national Delta Program. The aim of this Delta Program was to develop a strategic
policy plan for the long term that has to safeguard the Netherlands from the consequences of climate
change related to floods, extreme rainfall, and droughts. One of the main characteristics of the Delta
Program was its openness for other than traditional actors to get involved in drafting long-term policy
strategies regarding flood risk management. This openness came with a more spatial perspective on
flood management because regional and local authorities added their (spatial) agenda to the discussion
about flood risk norms and ways to achieve these norms. Opening up the policy arena thus meant a
more inclusive problem definition on flood risk and management.
In late 2014, the main results of the Delta Program were laid down in the so-called Delta Decisions.
As van Buuren et al. [1] stated, two of the elements of multilayered safety were included. One Delta
decision was devoted to the issue of ‘land-use adaptation’ or water-robust planning (to come to
more risk-neutral spatial development on a voluntary basis), and the Delta Decision on ‘flood-risk
safety’ incorporated the possibility of ‘smart combinations‘. The latter is aimed to provide the
opportunity for exceptional situations in which dike enforcement can be replaced by a combination of
measures in the first, second, and third layer: partial dike enforcement, measures in the spatial domain
(compartmenting, waterproof development), and evacuation or risk reduction [1].
This Delta Program also laid the foundation for a new set of flood-risk norms in which the element
of risk was much more emphasized than in the former norms. This new approach also resulted in a
search for alternative governance approaches at the local and the regional levels to give meaning to this
new philosophy and to enable a search for solutions at all three layers. In the six regional sub-programs
of the Delta Program, the possibilities for MLS were explored. More specifically, the potentials of the
concept were explored in three regional pilot projects to see whether it was possible to replace dike
enforcements with a ‘smart combination’ of measures in all three layers [30].
The new policy paradigm, as proposed in the Dutch Delta Program, thus implies a couple of
significant adjustments of the ‘old’ paradigm. These adjustments are at least threefold. First of all,
the norms for flood-risk safety were adjusted in order to make them really “risk-based”. The norms
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are now based upon two elements: the probability of a flood in relation to the expected impact
of it in terms of economic losses and casualties. Secondly, by introducing the concept of MLS,
the Delta Program ensures that flood-risk safety is no longer solely approached from the perspective
of ‘prevention’. It also draws attention to the so-called ‘second layer’, the spatial planning of an
area, and the ‘third layer’, the possibilities for disaster and risk management. The Delta Program
created the possibility to regionally explore the most suitable way of realizing the norm: an integrated
package of measures of dike enforcement, spatial planning, and disaster management. Within the
Delta Program, the importance of explorative searches at the local or regional level in order to find
out which combination of measures fits best into the local context, the foreseen spatial developments,
and the agendas of stakeholders was emphasized. This was framed as a joint responsibility of all
regional actors.
The Delta Program also added the possibility of a ‘smart combination’. Within a specific situation
in which the norm necessitates dike enforcement, it became possible to exchange dike enforcement
with a specific combination of measures in the first, second, and third layers. Such a combination
should result in a lower norm for the dike and a formal commitment among the various responsible
authorities to implement and maintain this combination of measures.
When we analyze the way in which the concept of MLS was used in the context of the Delta
Program in the period between 2011 and 2014, we refer to the last column of Table 2, in which we
sketch the various rules (in theory) the concept of MLS imply. In theory, the idea of MLS implies a
fundamental shift toward a more loosely organized governance system. It implies that all actors that
can possibly contribute to risk reduction at one of the three layers are welcome in a regional policy
arena around a diked area (boundary rules: 4). It also presupposes that all these actors (e.g., the water
boards, public safety regions, the municipalities, and other actors) internally develop a set of rules
to set up a regional dialogue to discuss the way in which flood risk is dealt with (positions rules: 4).
Regarding boundary rules, the idea of MLS can be seen as an open invitation to all actors within a
certain region to bring in their ideas that could function as a building block at one of the three layers.
Developing a MLS strategy necessitates a regional dialogue in which all relevant stakeholders can
contribute their ideas. It requires a very knowledge-intensive search in which an open and creative
search can emerge toward innovative and integrative solutions. In various pilots, such a search was
organized, and actors developed ideas about how to give meaning to this idea [30,66,67].
3.2. The Concept in Practice
However, in practice (the third column of Table 2), it proved very difficult to implement the
concept of MLS as originally envisioned (the fourth column of Table 2). The concept was translated
in such a way that it was more or less compatible with the current institutional practice. In the final
Delta Decisions, the first layer was said to safeguard a ‘basic level of safety’. The new norms for the
dikes have to ensure that the mortality rate due to flooding is 1 in 100,000, thus 0.001%. A strong
bias in favor of legal norms regarding the dikes dominated the ultimate Delta Decisions: The idea
of flood-risk management was entirely translated in a system of new norms for the dikes and thus
not for the second or third layer (which were deemed too difficult to control). The more conservative
community of national policymakers, civic engineers, and legal experts played an important role in this
translation process. In the implementation phase, the policy arena was much more closed compared to
the policy formulation stage. Regional and local actors were not in the position to defend or enforce the
original concept. As a result, the idea of MLS was severely downsized because the norms for flood-risk
safety are entirely focused upon the first layer, and all measures in the second and third layers are
framed as complementary but not substitutive for the first layer. They seemed as ‘nice to have’ but not
necessary. After the Delta Decisions were made, the new norms were implemented and translated
by the water authorities in a strategy for planning the necessary measures to meet the norms in time.
In this implementation process, many elements of the original concept (aimed at including the possible
consequences of a flood- which depend upon the spatial characteristics of an area - in the calculation
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of the strength of the flood defense needed) were skipped in order to simplify the implementation
challenge. At the moment, regional governance approaches around flood-risk management are less
tight, but the focus remains on flood prevention by means of hard structures (the first layer).
Thus, although the new system enables the water authorities to opt for more tailor-made
interventions to realize the norms, the actual resulting governance approach exhibits much more
tight characteristics and thus a hybrid mix. Table 2 (column three) presents the various rules as they
are currently in place regarding MLS. The current system of flood-risk management thus exhibits
an interesting division between the strategic level (which is about programming measures) and the
operational level (which is about implementing measures). At the strategic level, some regions invest
in an intergovernmental dialogue between water authorities, provinces, and municipalities. The scope
of such a dialogue differs in practice. In other regions, this dialogue is much less substantive and
mainly used by the water authorities to present their intended measures regarding dike enforcement.
Their plans are no longer only based on the technical specifications of the dike but also on the possible
consequences of a dike breach. At the operational level, the water authorities organized a participation
trajectory in order to fine-tune the way in which they implement dike enforcement. Within the domains
of spatial planning and disaster management, other authorities (with different ambition levels) explore
the possibilities for risk mitigation, but these trajectories are not entwined with the implementation
efforts of the regional water boards. These attempts differ not only when it comes to how ambitious
these are but also to what extent they are actually implemented. The latter mainly depends upon
opportunities for coupling these types of measures to other spatial developments.
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Table 2. Changes in the flood safety governance approach.
Flood-Safety Governance Approach until
2008: Tight
Flood-Safety Governance Approach after
2014: Fairly Tight
Envisioned Flood-Safety Governance
Approach
Boundary rules
1: Closed network of the Ministry of Water
Works, Inspection, regional water boards, and
Rijkswaterstaat, no access to new participants.
2: Before programming dike enforcement,
a regional dialogue has to be organized in
order to explore, at a more strategic level,
which flood-risk strategy is suitable. The
scope of this dialogue differs among regions.
4: Regional networks of all relevant actors
are open for every actor who can contribute
to MLS strategies or a ‘smart combination’ of
measures in the first, second,
and third layers.
Positions rules
2: Rijkswaterstaat and water boards are the lead
organizations and entirely responsible to do
what is necessary for safeguarding flood safety.
Provinces do have the opportunity to overrule,
but this is exceptional.
2: At the strategic (regional) level, the
coalition of involved actors is broadened, but
at the implementation level, the position of
the water authorities has not changed.
4: Within the regional actor network, the
possibilities for MLS options are explored.
The set-up of this exploration is arranged by
the network actors themselves.
Choice rules
1: The norms for flood safety include all
elements (ADICO) and are elaborated in
detailed technical standards and procedures.
The rules to receive funding from the Flood
Protection Program are strict.
2: The norms for flood-risk safety are
focused on the first layer. There are no
norms or standards for the second and third
layers, but actors look for ways to make
those types of measures less voluntary.
3: The norms for MLS are open and do not
contain a norm or a sanction when it comes
to the second and third layers.
Information rules
1: Formalized and standardized formats are
used to collect and share information (between
Rijkswaterstaat, water boards, funding
programs, and ministries, ministry).
2: At the strategic level, more information
about future dike enforcements and spatial
developments is shared in order to align
these agendas better. In many instances, this
information is still quite formal and strictly
task focused.
3: The regional exploration is aimed at
generating as much (potentially) relevant
information as possible from a variety of
sources and is shared in an open,
collaborative way.
Aggregation rules
1: Water boards decide unilaterally to disqualify
a dike and to prepare a proposal for
enforcement. The Flood Protection Program
decides which projects are funded, RWS and the
water boards decide how the enforcement is
designed and implemented.
1: The process of dike enforcement is
uncoupled from activities aimed at
organizing climate robustness.
3: The regional processes result in a
‘preferred alternative’ that has to be ratified
by the actors that have to realize the various
building blocks.
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Table 2. Cont.
Flood-Safety Governance Approach until
2008: Tight
Flood-Safety Governance Approach after
2014: Fairly Tight
Envisioned Flood-Safety Governance
Approach
Payoff rules
1: independent inspection is executed by the
Human Environment and Transport
Inspectorate. They inspect whether the regional
water boards realize their duty of care.
1: The system of inspection did not change
fundamentally.
4: No rules have been developed yet. Part of
the exploration was to find out which type of
rules could be formulated regarding
inspection and compliance, especially
regarding the second and third layers.
Scope rules
1: The scope of flood management is narrowly
defined and monodimensional, focused on
safeguarding the norms on flood defenses and
thus focused on the dike and its direct context.
2: The scope for flood-risk management
entails realizing the norms regarding flood
defense.
4: The scope of flood management is focused
on regions: Diked areas are integrally
approached to determine which
combinations of measures (technical, spatial,
or managerial) are possible and feasible.
If desired, the scope can be adjusted
(broadened or tightened, both in terms of the
geographical scale and of focus on
specific measures).
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4. Discussion
Although the need for a more adaptive, integrated, and risk-oriented way of dealing with the issue
of floods seems to be increasingly recognized, it remains very difficult to be freed from the classical
idea of controlling floods by maintaining a system of dikes and dams only. The responsible actors in
the Dutch flood-risk domain continue to tame the issue of flooding along three lines, which clearly
reflect the taming strategies of Roberts [4].
Firstly, by relying on experts in one particular issue arena, the legal and regulative capacity remain
in the hands of a few. The national government legally anchor new norms that are entirely translated
into standards for dikes, and the very controversial idea of ‘risk acceptance’ is averted. As a result,
all measures in the second and third layers are framed—by these actors who narrowly focus on flood
safety as the one issue—as voluntary additions to the first layer, which is, in principle, sufficient to
meet the norm. This is the second taming strategy of Roberts [4]. Thirdly, although a participative
trajectory was organized, the original lead organizations decided on the strategy. By formally stating
that a base level of safety is guaranteed by the first layer, the complexity of flood-risk management
(in terms of scope, involved actors, available options, etc.) is reduced to the simplified question
regarding the quality of flood defenses. This finding clearly supports the point of Daviter [3] that,
via taming, problems are not dealt with in a holistic way but result in a solution that fits the functional
specialization of a particular group of people. This taming strategy hinders reflexivity, as well as the
inclusion of local experience and knowledge [2]. Certainly, the absence of a learning attitude can be
explained by the rather strong path dependency that dominates this domain (cf. [1]) and the closed
epistemic community that, for a long time, dominated the knowledge base of Dutch flood policies [68].
The introduction of the concept of MLS implies a search for more polycentric approaches in which
the dominant position of the water authorities is reduced in favor of other actors who are responsible
for planning and disaster management. Although the uncontrollable character of flood-risk safety is
increasingly recognized, it is very difficult to acknowledge these unpredictable consequences in terms
of how flood risk is dealt with. Given the risk-averse opinion of the public in the Netherlands, the
strong normative consensus that the government is responsible for public safety, and the fact that
people perceive themselves safe behind the dikes makes it nearly impossible to communicate that
protection will never be perfect, that risks cannot be eliminated, and that it is important to think about
more integrated strategies instead of focusing on the height and thickness of the dikes. Moreover, the
consequences of a flood are, for most Dutch policymakers and citizens, too severe to accept. Therefore,
it has proved to be highly controversial to untame the issue of flood-risk safety and to successfully
implement MLS.
Two aspects make untaming very complicated. First of all, the current paradigm of flood-risk
management by protection—essentially built on the simplifying idea that flood management is about
protection—is seen as a very successful strategy that can be maintained even when the sea level rises
by several meters [69]. With the help of tight rules, the choice menu for participants is limited, which
leads to less uncertainty for those authorities responsible for maintaining flood-risk norms. Adopting
MLS requires the courage to be open to a more ambiguous problem definition that necessitates mutual
adjustment, exploratory strategies, and solutions that can only be realized with the help of all actors
involved. Furthermore, the current governance approach is not only the simpler one; it is also a deeply
embodied, path-dependent repertoire within the flood-risk domain [1]. There are strong self-reinforcing
mechanisms in this domain. Not only high sunk costs (because of the existing infrastructure of flood
defenses) but also learning and coordination effects make it difficult to leave the existing path [70].
The Dutch excel at flood protection, which causes a classical success trap [71].
5. Conclusions
In this article, we have developed a refined way to study governance approaches by distinguishing
several dimensions, which together define and form tighter or looser approaches. The seven rules
developed in this article, on the basis of the IAD framework [8], provide more insight into different
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elements of what can constitute a more polycentric and adaptive governance approach that can enhance
resilient socio-ecological systems confronted with climate-related risks, and this approach proved to be
a suitable analytical lens to study such issues. The seven rules give rich and in-depth insight into a
complex governance arena. It has shown to be a holistic framework that can grasp the hybridity of
governance arrangements and allows for comparison of approaches and over time.
By means of these rules, we have described the attempt to reinvent the governance of flood
risk in the Netherlands. Following advice from the Dutch Delta Commission to reframe the issue,
to re-configure the governance approach, and to have an open eye for new problem frameworks and
solutions, an innovative policy concept was introduced: MLS. This concept, envisioned to enlarge the
adaptivity of the Dutch flood-risk governance approach, was built on the idea that the core of the
existing policy paradigm, focusing upon prevention, had to be exchanged for the idea of risk reduction,
meaning that both the probability of a flood and its consequences are leverage points for measures.
Policymakers saw MLS as a way to enlarge the scope of possibilities beyond the traditional focus
on dike enforcement. Furthermore, it began a search for more polycentric and regional governance
approaches, in which various actors can develop ideas or take measures that contribute to flood-risk
reduction. In a couple of cases, this idea was piloted, and many interesting ideas were developed.
However, the ultimate governance approach that resulted constitutes a much less adaptive and loose
approach compared to the one envisioned.
The Dutch case of flood safety governance serves as a poignant example of an attempt to introduce
an alternative governance approach based upon the idea of Ostrom to promote polycentricity and
adaptivity in governance approaches. However, as demonstrated, this attempt also presupposes
that previously successful taming strategies and paths have to be abandoned once a new approach
is decided upon. Our case illustrates that untaming is not only highly controversial (because of the
current frame that the government has to safeguard the people against flooding) but also institutionally
very difficult due to the high institutional density and opacity of the current flood-risk domain. Taming
strategies are firmly anchored in existing institutional practices. Therefore, the lead actors—the small
group of established actors—demarcated and reframed the problem again as a tame issue to ensure
safety by means of protective measures.
Presenting only one single case study from a rather particular domain (flood management) in a
country with a strong tradition in this respect (the Netherlands), we must be cautious about drawing
strong conclusions regarding the possibilities for untaming complex issues. The question becomes
how we can successfully ‘untame’ different issues in different contexts in such a way that people
dare to adopt the new kind of governance approaches that allow for exploration and deliberation.
The answer to this question will differ amongst policy domains. Future research can focus on the
untaming issue in other domains, to see whether this approach is attainable in other ways, by other
actors and other approaches. However, from our case, we can conclude that acknowledging the power
of path-dependency mechanisms and thinking about a strategy to mitigate them are indispensable
steps for successfully untaming issues that (apparently) were successfully tamed for a long time.
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